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Abstract
Cloud computing relies on secure and efficient virtu-
alization. Software level security solutions compro-
mise the performance of virtual machines (VMs), as a
large amount of computational power would be uti-
lized for running the security modules. Moreover,
software solutions are only as secure as the level that
they work on. For example a security module on a
hypervisor cannot provide security in the presence of
an infected hypervisor. It is a challenge for virtualiza-
tion technology architects to enhance the security of
VMs without degrading their performance. Currently
available server machines are not fully equipped to
support a secure VM environment without compro-
mising on performance. A few hardware modifications
have been introduced by manufactures like Intel and
AMD to provide a secure VM environment with low
performance degradation. In this paper we propose
a novel memory architecture model named Architec-
tural Support for Memory Isolation(ASMI), that can
achieve a true isolated physical memory region to each
VM without degrading performance. Along with true
memory isolation, ASMI is designed to provide lower
memory access times, better utilization of available
memory, support for DMA isolation and support for
platform independence for users of VMs.
1 Introduction
In a server system, sharing resources among virtual
machines (VMs) implies that the resources of the
server are accessed simultaneously among different
users. Users’ concerns about physical device sharing,
stem from the fact that their data resides in these
shared devices, and virtualization technology has to
provide the necessary mechanisms to ensure the secu-
rity of user data. Protection of user data at differ-
ent levels of architecture like CPU, memory and In-
put/Output (I/O) devices has to be provided, proved
and assured to convince the users of the credibility
of the system. The survey reports [1] [2] [3] on the
security of VMs, show that
• VMs should be as isolated as physical machines,
i.e., the only means of communication between
them should be exactly as between two different
physical machines (Isolation Property of VMs)
• Hypervisors cannot be trusted, due to the pos-
sibility of hypervisor based malware, and other
infections possible on hypervisors
An isolated VM environment can be provided by the
hypervisor, either through hardware modifications or
through additional software modules that restrain a
VM from accessing other VMs’ data at various archi-
tectural levels [1]. Software modules to impose these
restrictions would take additional CPU clock cycles
and thereby reduce VM performance, implying that
software solutions could provide security to VMs only
at the cost of compromising VM performance. A
hardware modification could impose these restraints
with a lesser performance degradation, as it would use
either a marginal number of additional clock cycles,
or simply a negligible increase in the pipeline cycle
time. Hence, we aim at designing enhancements to
hardware that can achieve security for VMs without
compromising on their performance, and also provide
security in the presence of compromised hypervisors.
This paper reviews literature in the area of mem-
ory virtualization to identify open challenges that
prevent hypervisors from providing a true isolated
environment for VMs without losing out on perfor-
mance. Some open challenges have been identified and
a memory architecture model aimed at solving those
challenges is proposed, which unlike existing mem-
ory models like nested paging and IOMMU, does not
degrade performance. ASMI (Architectural Support
for Memory Isolation), our proposed model, requires
modification to hardware and is illustrated with the
help of hardware currently in popular use for support-
ing VMs.
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Memory virtualization techniques used in present
day systems have been reviewed in the Section 2,
along with the open challenges in memory virtualiza-
tion. Necessary features in any technology designed
for improving VMs in terms of security and perfor-
mance are identified in Section 3, along with a de-
scription of the design of ASMI. Section 4 concludes
the article with future directions of research.
2 Memory Virtualization
The normal paging mechanism cannot be used [4] in
a virtualized environment. In a normal computing
environment, the paging hardware is accessed by the
single operating system to get the physical address
corresponding to the virtual address. In a virtual en-
vironment, a single physical memory is shared among
different VMs or guest operating systems (hereafter
referred as guest OS, in this paper).
If a guest OS accesses the paging hardware to trans-
late its virtual address, there are possibilities that a
guest OS may access a physical address which is pre-
viously accessed by another guest OS. As this is a se-
rious security threat to the isolation property of VMs,
the security of VMs at memory level, has to be assured
by isolating the physical pages of each VM from oth-
ers. A mechanism to differentiate the physical address
of each guest OS is a mandatory requirement.
A memory virtualization mechanism that is popu-
larly used in VM technology nowadays to achieve dif-
ferentiation of logical addresses is called Nested Pag-
ing [4]. The following section describes nested paging.
2.1 Nested Paging
In nested paging [4], the virtual address of the process
running in each VM is converted to a pseudo physical
address by the corresponding guest OS. This trans-
lation is achieved by looking up page tables, which
are maintained by the guest OS [4]. In the next level
of translation, the pseudo physical address stored in
page tables of each guest OS is translated to the ac-
tual physical address by the hypervisor. This trans-
lation is stored in the real map table maintained by
the hypervisor [4]. The hypervisor maintains a sep-
arate real map table for each guest OS. These two
page tables, in combination, are known as a nested
page table. Thus, in a virtual environment, there are
three layers of memory [4]. They are Physical Mem-
ory (Original device memory, visible to hypervisor),
Pseudo Physical Memory (Virtual view of physical
memory to VMs, visible to guest OS) and Virtual
Memory (Logical memory for each program, visible
to process)
On contemporary platforms, page translation is
supported by a combination of page table and a trans-
lation lookaside buffer (TLB). Currently there are two
different types of hardware configurations available for
address translation. One is an architectured page ta-
ble. The second is an architectured TLB [4]. Vir-
tualizing these hardware configurations is a primary
requirement for memory virtualization.
Each guest OS maintains its own page tables. These
page tables represent the virtual to pseudo physical
mapping that guest OS manages. To virtualize the
architectured page table, a shadow page table [4] is
used by the hypervisor, which contains the virtual ad-
dress and the corresponding physical address. Each
VM should have a shadow page table. When a con-
text switch (among VMs) occurs, the shadow page
table in use by the hypervisor changes according to
the currently active VM [4]. Shadow page tables are
updated along with the nested page tables.
In an architectured TLB, TLB stores the recently
occurred virtual to physical address translations. But
in a virtual environment these entries will be differ-
ent for each guest OS. So, when the context switch
between VMs happens, the TLB has to be flushed to
avoid the guest OS accessing the translations of an-
other guest OS. TLB flush on each context switch is
computationally expensive [4] [5]. Moreover, failure
to hit the TLB causes many extra pipeline cycles.
To overcome the problem, designers added an ex-
tra field named Address Space Identifier (ASID) to
the TLB. The ASID field is used to distinguish the
address of currently running process in a normal en-
vironment [4]. The ASID field entry shows the owner
(process) of the address translation entry in the TLB.
In a virtualized system, a virtual TLB is maintained
by the hypervisor, which contains the virtual ASID
field, virtual page field and the real page field. An
ASID map table is maintained by the hypervisor to
map the virtual ASID, of each process in each VM,
to a unique real ASID value. Only the address trans-
lations of the currently running process in the active
guest OS, are allowed to access from the TLB (distin-
guished by the real ASID field) [4].
Nested page tables along with either virtualized
versions of architectured page tables or with virtu-
alized versions of architectured TLBs, create a vir-
tual address space in VMs. However, there are issues
with this addressing mechanism, from the perspec-
tive of performance and security. The nested paging
technique compromises security while enabling Direct
Memory Access (DMA) mechanism [4] [6] .
The DMA mechanism is designed to work with the
actual physical address space. If the DMA mechanism
is enabled, the guest OS can reconfigure the device
to access the memory of another VM through DMA
mechanism [7]. A solution to this security threat, is to
disable the DMA mechanism. Disabling DMA reduces
performance because more CPU clock cycles would
be required for data transfer between memory and
I/O devices. Protecting memory by access from other
VMs while enabling DMA mechanism in I/O devices,
is called DMA isolation. DMA isolation has to be
achieved to enable the DMA mechanism and thereby
improve the performance of VMs.
The requirements for better performance without
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compromising security led to the development of
another address translation mechanism named I/O
Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) [8] which is ex-
plained next.
2.2 IOMMU
The IOMMU architecture is illustrated here with the
help of an Intel based technology named Intel VT-d
[9]. Intel introduced a DMA remapping hardware in
their chip set. A generalized IOMMU architecture is
implemented inside this DMA remapping hardware.
The process of converting the DMA address from one
form to another (virtual address to physical address)
is known as DMA remapping. The hardware for DMA
remapping is called DMA remapping hardware.
Intel VT-d architecture divides the physical address
space into different partitions. Each partition is a sub-
set of the entire physical memory. Each partition is
considered as a protection domain [9] [6]. I/O devices
are allocated to a single protection domain by the hy-
pervisor. I/O devices are not allowed to access any
domain other than the one it is allocated. VMs are
also allocated to a protection domain by the hypervi-
sor. A VM is allowed to access only the I/O devices
that are allocated to its own domain. VT-d enables
hypervisor to allocate one or more I/O devices to a
protection domain.
DMA isolation is achieved by restricting the access
to a protection domain by the I/O devices not as-
signed to that domain. DMA isolation is implemented
through two address translation tables used in this ar-
chitecture [9] [6]. They are
• Root Entry Table (RET)
• Context Entry Table (CET)
VT-d hardware treats the address in a DMA request
as a DMA Virtual Address(DVA) [9] [6]. DVA can be
a guest physical address (pseudo physical address) of
the VM to which the I/O device is assigned. Thus,
I/O devices that are assigned to a protection domain
can be provided a view of memory that is different
from the host physical memory. VT-d transforms the
DVA address to the host physical address with the
help of RET and CET.
Each DMA address has three fields [9] [6]. They
are Bus number, Device number and Function num-
ber. The bus number field content is used to index into
the RET. Each entry in the RET point to a CET. The
device number and function number field contents are
collectively used to index into the CET. Each entry in
CET points to an address translation structure which
is a multilevel page table similar to a IA-32 proces-
sor page table named hierarchical translation struc-
ture [9].
Since VMs are in different protection domains, I/O
devices alloted to a VMs protection domain would not
be able to access the memory of another VM. Thus,
in VT-d architecture, the DMA mechanism can be
enabled without compromising the security, thereby
improving the performance of I/O devices, and con-
sequently the performance of VMs.
It is observed from the two memory management
techniques, nested paging and IOMMU, that nested
paging would have the worse performance of the two,
due to the inability to safely use DMA. IOMMU ar-
chitecture allows the use of DMA and could achieve
DMA isolation, as the I/O devices and VMs are per-
mitted to access only one protection domain. Memory
translation is a two level lookup and is hence slower
than a normal environment.
Though the IOMMU architecture provides better
DMA isolation than nested paging, it still stays vul-
nerable to many security threats. In order to illustrate
the problem, we discuss the security threats and pro-
posed solution in literature, in the succeeding para-
graphs.
2.3 Security Threats
A survey on the security of VMs shows that there ex-
ist vulnerabilities at different architecture levels like
CPU, memory and network, which would help a ma-
licious VM to easily gain the control of the hypervisor
[1]. In the IOMMU architecture, the hypervisor has
access to all the memory locations including the en-
tire allocated memory space for machines. This would
result in the situation that a malicious VM infects a
hypervisor or an infected hypervisor could attack or
access the memory of another VM. Providing security
in the presence of infected hypervisor is considered
an open research problem in the area of the security
of VMs [7]. For improved security in the context of
infected hypervisors, solutions that move the protec-
tion of memory from hypervisor level to the hardware
level are desirable [7]. The proposed work in [7], called
HyperWall, is briefly discussed.
2.3.1 HyperWall
HyperWall [7] is an architectural solution aimed at
providing hardware for protecting guest VMs from a
malicious hypervisors. The HyperWall hardware is
proposed as an extension to the IOMMU hardware
unit. The authors claim that the key feature of Hy-
perWall is Confidentiality and Integrity protection
to VMs. HyperWall architecture provides additional
protection bits to each memory page without modi-
fying the paging structure in the hypervisor or guest
OS. Four protection bits are used by HyperWall asso-
ciated with each physical page. These protection bits
can represent four new protection modes to the phys-
ical page. They are Not assigned to any VM (Hyper-
visor access only), Assigned to a VM with hypervisor
and DMA allowed, Assigned to a VM with hypervisor
access denied and Assigned to a VM with neither hy-
pervisor nor DMA allowed. The pages assigned to a
VM are protected from other VMs and the hypervisor
by applying these user specification protection modes
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to each page.
According to our analysis, there exist security issues
with this architectural solution. They are
• HyperWall architecture aims to protect only the
confidentiality and integrity of a VMs data and
not availability. However, availability is also an
important security property. The architecture
does not provide the assurance of a minimum and
fair amount of memory to all VMs at all point of
their active lifetime. It allows the VM user to set
the memory page with a protection level which
denies access to DMA and hypervisor. Hence,
any malicious VM can use this feature to create
memory starvation for other VMs by locking sev-
eral pages at a time.
• HyperWall does not protect against covert chan-
nels and side channels attacks [7],which are the
main threat towards the isolation property of
VMs [1]. Most of the covert channel attacks
are done through memory [10], [11] [12] [13].
Without preventing those attacks at the memory
level, true isolation in the memory level cannot
be achieved.
Apart from security threats, there are performance
challenges to be met by virtualization mechanisms.
In the next two paragraphs, we state the major
reasons for memory slowdown that result in under-
performance, as identified in our survey.
2.4 Underutilization of Memory
Our survey on the challenges in memory architecture
shows that a huge volume of unutilized memory is
allocated to VMs [14] [15]. It is because, in the current
VM environment, the requested physical memory is
divided and allocated to VMs when they are created.
That memory would not be used by the assigned VMs
if they do not need that memory. But, it cannot be
assigned to other VMs that require memory. A fairer
allocation of physical memory is required.
Ginseng [14] is a solution to the problem of under-
utilization of VM memory. Ginseng runs in the hy-
pervisor, and allocates physical memory to a guest OS
via a balloon driver. The balloon driver is installed in
each guest OS. A balloon controller is installed in hy-
pervisor. The communication between balloon driver
in guest OS and balloon controller in hypervisor is
done through libvirt [14], an application programming
interface (API) for managing the hypervisor.
There are two types of communication modes be-
tween the balloon driver and balloon controller, In-
flation and Deflation. In inflation, the balloon driver
transfers memory from guest OS to the hypervisor.
The hypervisor keeps such memory from each guest
together as a memory pool, available to guest OS
when its assigned memory is over-utilized, through
deflation. By inflation and deflation, Ginseng solves
the problem of memory starvation effectively.
Mortar [15] is another technique which helps to uti-
lize this underutilized memory as a cache. There are
two uses for this cache. The first one is to use it as
a cache for pre-fetching disk blocks. The next is to
use it as a an application level distributed cache that
follows the memcached [16] protocol. Rather than al-
locating the underutilized memory to guest OS, this
architecture pools together the spare memory on each
guest OS and exposes it as a volatile cache. When-
ever the guest OS require its memory, the memory
cache objects are freed and given back to the guest
OS. This architecture also efficiently uses the under-
utilized memory.
The main difference between Ginseng and Mortar is
that Ginseng pools the unallocated memory and gives
it to other VMs, while Mortar pools the unallocated
memory and uses it as an application level cache.
Our analysis is that both Ginseng and Mortar are
susceptible to covert channel based attacks by col-
luding VMs on the same server, thereby risking user
program and data on the VMs.
2.5 Memory Access Times
Another major challenge in VM technology is to im-
prove the access time of memory for processes. Both
nested paging technique and IOMMU architecture use
two level memory address translation. In nested pag-
ing architecture as well as in IOMMU architecture,
address translation hardware is virtualized in such a
way that the address translation hardware is directly
accessible to hypervisor and not to guest OS [4] [6].
HyperWall architecture does not offer any improve-
ment in VM performance over IOMMU or nested pag-
ing either.
Existing literature also includes illustrations of
challenges and solutions in deduplication [17] [18] and
double-paging [19] features of VMs. Deduplication
and double-paging are implemented in hypervisors,
by sharing the memory pages among VMs and hy-
pervisor. Those features are considered as a threat to
memory isolation [1], and are hence not advisable for
use in clouds.
Enabling the access of address translation hardware
directly by the guest OS removes one level of indirec-
tion in address translation process. This would im-
prove the performance of VMs by improving the aver-
age memory access time. Clearly the need of the day
is to have a memory virtualization infrastructure that
supports the following properties even in the presence
of a malicious hypervisors.
• Isolated physical memory region to each VM
• Guest OS should be able to use the address trans-
lation hardware directly
• Fair allocation of physical memory among VMs
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3 Architectural Support for
Memory Isolation
The analysis presented in the previous section clearly
establishes that a novel mechanism has to be intro-
duced, such that it would be able to protect the mem-
ory of a VM from a malicious hypervisor, address the
problem of underutilization of memory in VMs, and
allow the user programs to use the address translation
hardware directly, for improved VM performance. We
propose ASMI, Architectural Support for Memory Iso-
lation, that can satisfy the above requirements. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the proposed architecture.
We propose ASMI as a generic solution, aimed at
providing hardware for enabling direct access to phys-
ical memory by the VMs. We illustrate and expand
the concept on an Intel platform with Intel-VT capa-
bilities [9], as details about the existing technology are
available in literature. Hence, hereafter, in this paper,
ASMI refers to the design enhancement we describe
in the succeeding paragraphs.
Description In an Intel 64 bit architecture, the
address translation mechanism disables segmentation
and only paging mechanism exists [20]. In ASMI, seg-
mentation is enabled and utilized to improve isolation.
The physical memory is partitioned into physical seg-
ments. Each segment should be of a fixed length.
Each segment contain fixed number of pages. A new
hardware unit named Pro-mem controls the entire
physical memory.
A new register named VMIDR is introduced and its
contents managed by each processor to store the iden-
tity of the currently running VM on that processor.
A unique ID is assigned and stored in VMIDR regis-
ter by the Pro-mem unit when a new VM is created.
Switch between VMs on a processor causes a changes
in the VMIDR value, done by the Pro-mem. Moving
the control of execution from VM to hypervisor and
vice versa would be informed to the Pro-mem by the
VM Exit and VM Entry instructions.
VM Entry and VM Exit are the instructions in Intel
VT architecture [9] that move the execution to and
fro between VMs and hypervisor. In the proposed
architecture, these instructions are modified to inform
the Pro-mem unit about the control transfer among
VMs and hypervisor in an atomic manner.
SegMax is introduced, which is maintained by Pro-
mem and contains the maximum number of seg-
ments(MSEG) that can be assigned to a VM when
the entire physical memory is full. The value stored
in MSEG is calculated by dividing the total number of
physical segments (TSEG) in primary memory with
TOT, where TOT is the sum of total number of VMs
and hypervisor running above the hardware.
SegMax, MSEG, and TOT values are not fixed.
They are changed when a new VM is created or when
an old one is destroyed. TSEG is fixed at boot time,
by the hypervisor, depending on the page size that
the hypervisor is designed to work with. TSEG val-
ues cannot be changed until next reboot. Initially at
boot time, MSEG and TOT values are zero. When a
hypervisor is loaded or a VM is created, TOT value
is incremented by one and MSEG is recalculated ac-
cording to the new TOT value.
A new data structure named Memory Protection
Table (MPT) is also proposed, and it is managed by
the Pro-mem. MPT contains the segment ID (SegID)
and its corresponding virtual Machine ID (VMID).
Each segment can be assigned to a single VM. MPT
would be stored in the primary memory as shown in
Figure 1. This primary memory portion of MPT will
be inaccessible to any software module. This table is
accessible only to the Pro-mem unit. A VMID value
zero in MPT is used to indicate the segments that
belongs to the hypervisor.
Initially, when the physical machine boots, the
MPT will be empty. When the hypervisor is started
by the BIOS, Pro-mem stores a unique ID to the
VMIDR register. Similarly when a VM is created, a
unique ID is stored in VMIDR register by Pro-mem.
When the VM exit instruction is executed, VMIDR
contents would get stored in the initial address of the
first memory segment of the corresponding VM and
the VMIDR is loaded with the initial address of the
first memory segment of the hypervisor. Similarly
when the VM entry instruction executes, the VMIDR
value is stored in the initial address of the first seg-
ment of hypervisor and the VMIDR value is loaded
from the initial address of the first segment of the
running VM. These load and store operations are ex-
ecuted by Pro-mem as atomic operations to VM exit
and VM entry instructions.
Allocation When a VM requests for a memory
page, Pro-mem would check for available free pages
in the allotted segments. If a free page is available in
the allotted segment, it would be assigned to the VM.
If no free pages are available, Pro-mem would check
for a free segment. If a free segment available, it is
allotted to the current VM, the MPT updated and
the page assigned to the VM.
When no free segments are available, Pro-mem
would check whether any of the VMs has been allot-
ted more than MSEG number of segments. The num-
ber of segments by which it exceeds MSEG would be
informed to the corresponding VM by the Pro-mem,
to make it free through swapping. Then those pages
would free be used by the requesting VM. If no VM
is using more than MSEG segments, Pro-mem will
send a memory full exception to the requesting VM.
This exception can be used by the guest OS to swap
its allotted memory pages and load the new one, and
thereby continue its execution.
The above techniques ensure a minimum number
of physical segments or a minimum amount of phys-
ical memory to each VM when the physical memory
need is the maximum. It simultaneously ensures that
physical memory is not be left free or unutilized when
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Figure 1: ASMI: Architectural Support for Memory Isolation
a VM requires it. Hence, an optimum utilization of
physical memory can be achieved by this architecture.
Access Access to segments would be validated by
Pro-mem with the help of VMIDR value and MPT
table. Pro-mem would raise an exception if a VM
or hypervisor tries to access the segment which is not
allotted to it. The main advantage of this architecture
is that it can provide memory isolation among VMs
and hypervisor irrespective of the hypervisor security.
In this version, we propose Pro-mem to be installed
in between hardware paging architecture and primary
memory. The paging unit would be modified to in-
clude Pro-mem functionality. Each guest OS main-
tains a page table in memory, which contains the vir-
tual address and its corresponding physical address.
The guest OS gives the virtual/linear address to the
paging unit. The paging unit would give this linear
address to the Pro-mem unit. Pro-mem would return
the physical address, within the guest OS alloted seg-
ment, to the paging unit. The paging unit would re-
turn this physical address to the guest OS.
Performance and Security The physical address
obtained in guest OS, by the address translation de-
scribed above, would be the actual physical address
within the allotted physical segment. Only a single
level address translation is required in this architec-
ture. It would improve the performance of VMs, as
it improves over two level translation. DMA can be
enabled because the memory allotted to a VM can not
be accessed by the other VMs as they are separated
by different segments. Separating the physical mem-
ory of each VMs at the hardware level could provide
hypervisor-independent security to VMs.
Operating systems in a normal environment use the
paging hardware to translate linear addresses to phys-
ical addresses. In a virtual environment, the guest
operating system uses the paging hardware with Pro-
mem to translate its linear address to the physical
address, and the physical address range is controlled
by the Pro-mem. Thus, the guest operating system
directly uses the address translation hardware (Pag-
ing unit with Pro-mem) similar to the normal (not
virtualized) environment. Hence, no modification to
guest OS is required. This enables the use of native
operating systems, and a performance much better
than existing virtualized systems.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
A memory architecture model named ASMI, has been
proposed and described in the paper. ASMI provides
an isolated memory region to each VM and the hyper-
visor. ASMI has been illustrated in this paper on an
Intel Platform with hardware enhancements to imple-
ment the design. ASMI is designed to provide mem-
ory isolation to VMs, irrespective of the integrity of
hypervisor.
Our architecture includes an address translation
unit named Pro-mem. Pro-mem is shared among VMs
in time division multiplexing without compromising
security, to improve address translation performance.
The design of Pro-mem solves the problem of under-
utilization of memory, as Pro-mem allocates memory
to VMs only on individual requests and does not pre-
allocate. ASMI can thus provide confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability to VMs at memory level irre-
spective of hypervisor security without compromising
performance.
Implementing ASMI through kernel level simula-
tions and comparison of the security and performance
of VMs with the currently available memory archi-
tectures like IOMMU and nested paging are planned
as future tasks in our research. ASMI is a generic
solution. Studying the suitability of ASMI on other
architectures like MIPS, and other RISC variants, is
also included in our research agenda.
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